How the mammalian brain solves the problem of visual recognition has been a topic of study since the early days of cognitive science. David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel (1959) received the Nobel Prize for their discovery of organized columns of orientation-tuned neurons in cat visual cortex. This critical result appeared to capture an important facet of visual processing-a visual system that is sensitive to edges (boundaries between regions of light and dark) positioned at different orientations in space. Once the particular orientations of edges are known, it seemed only a small step to "connect the dots"-joining edges into more complex descriptions of object shape. Edge-based representations appeared ideal for recognition: shape defining edges often capture the critical features of objects and remain relatively invariant over many image transformations. Thus, most vision scientists came to believe that the goal of vision was to derive or reconstruct an edge-based description of object shape.
It was this belief that drove David Marr to develop two ideas that have dramatically influenced the study of visual object recognition. The first was a computational theory in which Marr and Ellen Hildreth (1980) proposed what they saw as the processing constraints needed to build a successful edge detector. They observed that an implemented version of their detector behaved much like some subclasses of visual neurons (so-called "simple cells"). Once Marr had a plausible algorithm for finding local edges in an image, he was able to argue that early visual processing derived increasingly complex representations of shape built from such local edges-at the endpoint of this progression was a 2D description of object shape referred to as the full primal sketch. To Marr, however, the full primal sketch was inadequate as a representation for visual recognition. Although potentially invariant over changes in the appearance of an object's surfaces, as a 2D representation described in a frame of reference based on the observer ("viewer-centered") the full primal sketch still varied dramatically with changes in object viewpoint. As such, recognition using only the full primal sketch seemed to require a potentially infinite number of 2D descriptions for each 3D object (one description for each unique view). Consequently, Marr believed that the representations underlying visual recognition should be insensitive to changes in viewpoint. This constraint led Marr to develop his second critical idea-3D parts-based descriptions for object recognition. Marr and Keith Nishihara (1978) proposed that the full primal sketch is used to derive a 3D representation by first adding information about the relative depths and orientations of surfaces and then by grouping such surfaces into 3D object parts. They argued that 3D volumes known as "generalized cylinders" formed an appropriate method for describing such parts. Critical to their theory was the fact that the visual frame of reference used in the generalized cylinder representation was object centered. As such, an object's description would not vary with changes in the viewpoint of the observer relative to the object. To Marr and Nishihara the use of an object-centered reference frame seemed a computationally elegant solution to the problem of how to derive a consistent mapping from variable images to a single object or class. Indeed, to a great many others studying the problem of vision, Marr and Nishihara's proposal seemed to offer the first tractable answer to the problem of visual recognition. This and related viewpoint-invariant parts-based models, most notably Biederman's (1987) Recognition-By-Components theory (RBC), have and continue to have enormous influence.
Pandora's Box
Much like Pandora's box, simple experiments can sometimes lead to unforeseen results. In 1984 most vision researchers took for granted some version of Marr and Nishihara's model of object recognition and, in particular, the idea that mental representations of objects are encoded using an object-centered reference frame. Only a handful of experimental psychologists, however, had attempted to test aspects of this model. Steven Pinker and I observed that the central question of whether objects were represented in a viewer-centered or an object-centered reference frame was unanswered. The few studies that had tried to address this issue had used familiar shapes (e.g., letters-see, Corballis, Zbrodoff, Shetzer, & Butler, 1978) as stimuli and therefore could not distinguish between a true object-centered representation and a viewer-centered representation composed of specific views at each familiar vantage point. Either approach would predict equivalent performance in terms of response speed and accuracy across familiar orientations-where they differed was in what happened at unfamiliar viewpoints. Unfortunately, because the stimuli used in most experiments were highly familiar, subjects had, in all likelihood, already encountered them in many orientations. Furthermore, many of the stimuli used in such studies were highly distinctive from one another, for example, the "tail" on a 'Q' is not found in any other letter. Thus, apparent evidence for object-centered representations, e.g., equivalent recognition performance across different viewpoints, may be misleading. To address these concerns Pinker and I designed a set of stimuli that fulfilled three criteria: (1) novelty; (2) no distinct local features; and (3) well-defined axes (to eliminate any need for viewpoint-dependent axis-finding procedures that might serve as a necessary precursor to recovering 3D parts). These simple 2D shapes ( Figure 1a ) were used in a straightforward test of object-vs. viewer-centered reference frames (Tarr & Pinker, 1989) . Subjects were trained to associate nonsense names (e.g., "KIP") with individual shapes shown at the upright and then practiced naming the same shapes at selected orientations in the picture-plane. During this practice we observed that when subjects first encountered the shapes in these new orientations, their naming performance varied as a function of the distance between the unfamiliar orientations and the trained upright orientation. Although this pattern of viewpoint dependence could be taken as evidence for viewer-centered representations, we reasoned that object-centered descriptions might take some time to develop. Indeed, as subjects became more and more practiced at naming the objects, their performance at all of the previously-unfamiliar orientations became equivalent. Much as with familiar objects, this viewpoint invariance may be attributed to two quite different underlying causes-subjects learning a viewpoint-invariant object-centered representation for each shape or subjects learning multiple viewpoint-specific viewercentered representations for each shape.
To distinguish between these two possibilities Pinker and I introduced a condition in which subjects were shown the now-familiar shapes in new, never-before-seen orientations. If subjects had learned the shapes in an object-centered format, then their performance at the new orientations should have been no different from their performance at the familiar orientations. Much to our surprise this is not what we found (we had been expecting to confirm Marr's hypothesis)-subjects' performance at the new orientations varied systematically with the distance from the nearest familiar orientation. This result is exactly what is predicted if subjects were learning multiple orientation-specific shape representations at each familiar orientation-a "multipleviews" description ( Figure 3 ). We also observed that the magnitude of this viewpoint dependence was almost identical at the beginning of the experiment when subjects were familiar with the shapes in only the upright orientation and at the end of the experiment when subjects were familiar with the shapes in multiple orientations. Thus, a single shape recognition mechanism, based on learning objects in specific viewpoints and then mentally transforming unfamiliar viewpoints to the familiar views (sometimes referred to as "normalization") appeared to be at work.
This apparently straightforward finding of viewpoint dependence in object recognition has become a critical result in motivating the research I have pursued in the years since. At the core of this research is the question of how humans recognize objects. At a more specific level, answering this question will require understanding the contributions of three aspects of recognition:
• The image geometry for objects and object classes and how it changes with changes in 3D orientation, illumination, etc.;
• The level of categorization required for a given task, varying from coarse "basic-level" categorization to fine item-specific recognition;
• The differing degrees of perceptual expertise that observers have with specific object classes and how visual experience fine-tunes the recognition system to attain such expertise.
The research reviewed here addresses each of these issues, exploring them through a variety of converging techniques, including computer-graphics psychophysics, brain imaging using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), and neuropsychology with brain-injured subjects.
Three-Dimensional Object Recognition
Given evidence for multiple-views across changes in picture-plane orientation, it was natural to wonder whether the result extended to the recognition of 3D objects rotated in depth. There are reasons to believe that rotations in depth might be treated differently from rotations in the picture-plane. The former produce geometric changes in the structure of the 2D image as 3D surfaces come in and out of view and change their orientation relative to the observer. In contrast, the latter have no impact on the 2D image structure, but do change the top-bottom and left-right relations between features relative to the observer. Thus, viewpoint dependence may be a consequence of changes in the spatial relations within objects, rather than a fundamental organizing principle for visual representation.
Using what was at the time state-of-the-art 3D software, I created a set of 3D stimuli that fulfilled the same criteria used in the original Tarr and Pinker study ( Figure 1b) . As in our earlier study, I trained subjects to name each object from the near-upright orientation, then practiced subjects at recognizing the same objects in a selected set of viewpoints. Here, however, the practice viewpoints were generated by rotations in depth around either the vertical or the horizontal axis, as well as by rotations in the picture-plane. Following practice, new, never-before-seen-viewpoints were generated by similar rotations interspersed among the now-familiar viewpoints. The results were astonishingly clean-for each axis of rotation there was a clear pattern of viewpoint dependence (Tarr, 1989 (Tarr, , 1995 . At the beginning of the experiment this pattern was systematically related to the distance from the single training view. Following practice and the introduction of new unfamiliar viewpoints, this pattern was systematically related to the distance from the nearest familiar view regardless of whether the view was generated by a rotation in depth or in the picture-plane. As before, the magnitude of this pattern was quite similar during both the initial recognition of new views and the recognition of additional new views following practice. Thus, together with my earlier findings, there seemed to be good evidence for generally applicable viewer-centered visual recognition mechanisms.
Beyond the basic finding of viewpoint dependence, there was one other piece of evidence that strongly implicated viewpointdependent recognition processes in both the 2D and 3D versions of my experiments. In the 2D case we had run a variant in which subjects learned a "standard" version of each shape, but then following practice, were asked to apply the same name to mirror-reflected versions of the familiar shapes. We were puzzled to find that subjects showed the same relatively slow performance regardless of the pictureplane orientation of the unfamiliar mirror-reflected shape. Pinker and I came to the realization that this is exactly what is predicted by a recognition process that is normalizing unfamiliar mirror-reflected shapes at any orientation to a familiar view of the familiar standard version-for any orientation of a mirror-reflected shape, the shortest path to its standard is a 180° flip-in-depth ( Figure  2 ). Figure 2 . A 180° "flip-in-depth" is always the shortest path to align a mirror-reflected version of a 2D shape with its standard in a recognition task. Apparently the human visual system knows this too.
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This result in itself does not provide definitive evidence for normalization between standard and mirror-reflected versions of shapes. One alternative is that when subjects encounter a mirror-reflected version of a familiar shape, they cannot deduce a rotation that will align it with its standard and therefore resort to viewpoint-invariant object-centered features. In the 3D version of my experiment, however, I obtained results that ruled out this alternative-when subjects first encountered mirror-reflected versions of familiar 3D objects there was no rotation in 3D space that would bring the two into correspondence. Just as aligning mirror images of 2D shapes requires a 3rd dimension, aligning mirror images of 3D objects requires a 4th dimension. Thus, subjects either needed to employ a 4D mental transformation, turn the mirror-reflected object inside-out (in the same way that an inside-out left-handed glove matches a right-handed glove), or use some other strategy. In the 3D case subjects did not show equivalent performance across different unfamiliar viewpoints of mirror-reflected objects-rather they exhibited viewpoint dependence quite similar to that found for the recognition of standard versions of the objects in unfamiliar viewpoints. One possibility is that subjects normalized the major vertical axis of the mirror-reflected objects into correspondence with the standard version and then observed whether the protruding parts were symmetrical between the pair. Regardless of the exact strategy used by subjects, the combinations of findings from the 2D and 3D experiments provide compelling evidence for a multiple-views object representation that is matched to object images through viewpoint-dependent normalization procedures (Figure 3 ).
Perceptual Classification Using Viewpoint-Dependent Mechanisms
Object recognition, broadly defined, involves a wide range of tasks, including the recognition of specific individual objects and the classification of many different objects into a single category. The results from my 2D and 3D recognition experiments suggest that some aspects of recognition rely on viewpoint-dependent mechanisms, but do not address whether this is the only process available for recognition. Indeed, given that I intended to make the stimuli highly confusable, my results may speak more to objectspecific recognition, so-called "subordinate-level" tasks, rather than object categorization, socalled "basic-level" tasks. This hypothesis became known as the "dual systems" approach (e.g., Figure 3 . A possible multiple-views representation of a motorcycle-3D objects are represented as a set of viewpoint-specific models. Jolicoeur, 1990) and posited that while subordinate-level recognition might involve viewpoint-dependent processes, basic-level recognition, often thought to be the "default" level of access, was based on viewpoint-invariant processes.
Evidence for this dichotomy was rather slim, but gained some support from a study by Irving Biederman and Peter Gerhardstein (1993) in which they obtained viewpointinvariant recognition performance for several sets of 3D objects containing distinctive features or parts-similar to basic-level categorization. Based on their results, Biederman and Gerhardstein argued that human object recognition typically occurs at the basic-level where distinctive features are available to discriminate between object classes and therefore recognition is viewpoint invariant. In contrast, they argued that discrimination tasks lacking distinctive features are the exception rather than the rule and therefore viewpoint-dependent recognition is rarely found. My students, William Hayward, Isabel Gauthier, and Pepper Williams, and I wondered about this result. Although we had no strong belief that viewpoint-dependent processes extended to basic-level recognition, there were methodological issues in Biederman and Gerhardstein's study that led us to question their conclusions. In particular, in some experiments they used familiar common objects that were likely to have already been learned at multiple viewpoints, thereby masking any viewpoint-dependent recognition processes. In other experiments they used line drawings of novel objects containing highly distinctive features, but a task in which subjects were required to remember only one object at a time over a series of trials-such a task might have predisposed subjects to adopt a strategy in which they relied on the local distinct features of the single object.
In order to assess the role of viewpoint-dependent recognition processes in discriminations that corresponded to the basic-level, we created several sets of novel 3D objects-one in which each object was a single distinctive part and several sets in which each object was composed of a central unique body-part with additional parts attached to it (an example of one such "multi-part" object is shown in Figure 1d ). Employing each set separately, we ran an extensive series of experiments using a variety of recognition tasks, including object naming, pairwise matching, and the single object memory task used by Biederman and Gerhardstein. Much to our astonishment the results were unequivocal in each and every case-strong viewpoint-dependent recognition performance was found regardless of the object set and the recognition task (Tarr, Hayward, Gauthier, & Williams, 1994; Hayward & Tarr, 1997) . These effects, albeit smaller than those obtained for objects that did not contain distinctive features, were highly systematic across changes in 3D viewpoint and were unaffected by whether or not parts became visible or disappeared from view. We could reach only one conclusion-visual object recognition, regardless of the level of categorization, is mediated by viewpoint-dependent mechanisms.
This finding of viewpoint dependence was potentially problematic for extant viewpointdependent models of recognition. Such models assumed template-like object representations (e.g., Poggio & Edelman, 1990 ) that did not seem suitable for supporting perceptual categorization. The particular reason for this critique is that categorizing objects requires a many-to-one mapping in which objects of varying shape are treated as equivalent. Two-dimensional template-like representations seemed ill-suited for this task in that no mechanisms had been offered for relating the similarity of different instances of a perceptual category. Thus, two objects with only slightly different shapes might still be treated by the recognition system as completely unrelated. Within viewpoint-invariant part-based models, however, the categorization problem is solved by using qualitative descriptions of object parts. Consequently, visually similar instances of an object class are treated as related, because they give rise to the same part-based representation, regardless of small variations in object shape. The challenge before us was to understand how viewpoint-dependent multiple-views object representations could support basic-level, as well as subordinate-level, recognition.
Isabel Gauthier and I were intrigued by several computational models that used "multidimensional feature interpolation" to generalize from one instance of a category to new, never-before-seen instances of the same category (Beymer & Poggio, 1996; Moses, Ullman, & Edelman, 1996) . Such models assumed that viewpoint-dependent object representations were composed of large numbers of viewpoint-dependent local features and that recognition of any object whether identical to a known object or unfamiliar involved measuring the local similarity between such features. Thus, as an alternative to globally attempting to compare input images to views of an objects, these models proposed local comparisons in which features of each object representation could "vote" for their presence in the image. The visual system could then simply tally up the votes for each object or class and decide on a winner.
Gauthier and I were interested in testing these models behaviorally. In particular, we asked whether viewpoint-dependent recognition processes could generalize between instances of a class. To this end we created two sets of stimuli-one set using 2D shapes similar to the shape shown in Figure 1a and one set of 3D objects, an example of which is shown in Figure 1c . The critical property of the 2D set was that perceivers agreed that the shapes were visually similar to one another and formed a single perceptual class. Gauthier and I observed that when subjects recognized an object in a given orientation and this trial was preceded by a trial in which the same object had appeared in the same orientation, there was no effect of orientation-performance was equivalent regardless of the actual orientation of the object . This result suggested that the visual recognition system had residual activation about the viewpoint-specific appearance of object shape from the previous trial that facilitated recognition on the subsequent trial. In a second experiment we controlled for the degree of similarity between the preceding object and the subsequent object. We again found that repeating the same object in the same orientation facilitated viewpoint-invariant recognition performance. Crucially, we also found that repeating a visually-similar object, but not a visually dissimilar object, in the same orientation also facilitated performance that was independent of the distance from the upright, as if there was viewpoint-specific transfer from one instance of a class to a new member of that class. We concluded that recognition processes generalize across visually-similar objects appearing in the same viewpoint even when the recognition task is to discriminate between these objects. Thus, viewpoint-dependent mechanisms can mediate basic-level as well as subordinate-level recognition.
As mentioned, Gauthier and I also created a set of 3D objects ( Figure 1c ) to investigate aspects of this question. The 3D set consisted of 6 pairs of objects ("cohorts") that within a pair shared the same distinct central part and the same Visual Object Recognition -9-attached parts, but with the attached parts in different arrangements so that the members of the pair could be distinguished. Thus, each pair formed a distinct object class. We were interested in two specific predictions of a viewpoint-dependent classgeneral model of recognition. First, the processes we had observed for generalization across rotations in the picture-plane should also apply to rotations in depth. Second, in our earlier study subjects were always shown all of the objects in all of the test views-here we wondered whether a known view of one member of a class would facilitate the recognition of other members of the class that had never been seen in that view. Gauthier and I ran an experiment in which one member of each pair was shown to subjects in several viewpoints (different for each pair) and its cohort was shown to subjects only in one viewpoint. Following training, subjects named both members of each pair in a wide range of viewpoints, both familiar and unfamiliar. For the members of each pair shown in several viewpoints we found a pattern of viewpoint dependence similar to that seen in my original 3D experiments-recognition performance was systematically related to the distance from the nearest familiar view.
At the same time we found that the cohort objects that had only been trained in one viewpoint showed a similar pattern of viewpoint dependence (Tarr & Gauthier, 1996) . It was as if subjects had actually seen these objects in the cohort view and were able to use such information to recognize the objects in completely unfamiliar viewpoints.
Before we could conclude that there was indeed viewpoint-specific transfer between visually-similar cohorts we needed to run a critical control. An alternative account was that similar object geometry for both members of a cohort, in particular for new views generated by rotations in depth, produced the common performance patterns found for both members of each pair. We tested this possibility by running an experiment in which subjects were again trained to name both members of each pair, but where all objects were shown only in a single, common viewpoint. As before, we then tested their recognition performance across a wide range of viewpoints. The elegance of this control is that the cohort objects shown in only one viewpoint in the first experiment were shown in exactly the same viewpoints during training and test in this experiment-the only difference between experiments was the viewpoints in which the other member of each pair was shown. Compared to the first experiment we found different results-subjects' recognition performance for the cohort objects was highly viewpoint dependent, but now related to the distance from the single trained viewpoint. Most importantly, there was a dramatic difference in naming performance around the cohort views. In the first experiment the cohort objects showed facilitation as if they had actually been seen in these views, here there was no such facilitation. Taken together, our 2D and 3D studies indicate that viewpoint-dependent mechanisms are capable of class generalization and can support a range of recognition tasks spanning the continuum from basic-level categorization to item-specific recognition.
Although the results reviewed to this point provide evidence for the wide applicability of viewpoint-dependent mechanisms, they do not address the specifics of what comprises a viewpoint-dependent representation. What is necessary is a format that is sufficiently flexible to adapt to tasks at many different categorical levels. My colleague Heinrich Bülthoff and I had observed that although the modal finding across many studies was viewpoint-dependent performance, the magnitude of this effect appeared to vary. We hypothesized that the mediating variable was the discriminability of the stimuli that were to be distinguished. We were interested in examining what kinds of representational features played a role in modulating these viewpoint-dependent processes.
To that end, we created 4 sets of novel 3D objects based on "paperclip" objects used in studies by Bülthoff and Shimon Edelman (1992) : objects comprised of 5 "tubes" connected end to end; objects comprised of a distinctively-shaped part in the central position and 2 tubes attached to each end of this part; objects comprised of a distinct sequence of 3 different parts with 1 tube attached to each end; and objects comprised of a distinct sequence of 5 different parts. For the three-part and five-part objects some parts appeared in more than one object, thereby making the local features, but not the part configurations, of a given object confusable with other objects in the set. The angles between tubes or parts were also varied for each object in each set so that along with differences in part shape, each object could be distinguished on the basis of the configuration of parts.
Using both a pairwise matching task and a naming task we trained subjects to recognize objects in one viewpoint and then examined recognition performance across rotations in depth. Results for the five-tube and single-part sets were consistent with our previous work-the magnitude of viewpoint dependence was quite large in the fivetube condition where no distinctive shape features were available, while the magnitude of viewpoint dependence was much smaller in the single-part condition (Tarr, Bülthoff, Zabinski, & Blanz, 1997) . What is critical is the magnitude of this effect in the three-part and five-part conditions. Viewpoint-invariant part-based models (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993) hypothesize that the molar features of recognition are configurations of parts-therefore, they appear to predict that adding distinct parts as in the three-and five-part conditions should, at a minimum, be no different than the single-part condition and, at best, even less sensitive to changes in viewpoint given the additional distinguishing representational elements (for example, single-part objects necessarily differ in only one part, but the three-part objects always differed from one another by at least two parts). In contrast, Bülthoff and I (1995) had hypothesized that the molar features of recognition are local viewpointdependent features-therefore, the most distinctive condition would be the single-part case where the local features within each central part were distinctive from one another. In contrast, in the three-and five-part conditions, the additional parts might be distinctive as elements of a configuration, but as local features they would add confusion across objects. Consequently we predicted that viewpoint dependence would increase in magnitude in the three-part condition and would be even larger in the five-part condition-possibly reaching the same level observed in the five-tube a b c d Figure 4 . The novel 3D objects we created to assess the kinds of features used in viewpoint-dependent recognition. Objects are examples from the: a) five-tube set; b) single-part set; c) three-part set; and d) five-part set. Adapted from Tarr, Bülthoff, Zabinski, & Blanz (1997) .
condition. This is precisely what we found, concluding that object recognition involves viewpoint-dependent processes that are sensitive to the distinctiveness of local image features.
A similar conclusion can be made from an experiment I ran with William Hayward.
Here we had subjects simply recognize isolated parts across rotations in depth. For each part we generated two rotations of equal magnitude: one in which all of the local image features were distorted and one in which the local image features changed qualitatively ( Figure 5 ). Subjects learned a target view and then recognized one of the two rotated views.
Part-based models unquestionably predict that recognition should be equivalent across these two conditions in that the same part description should be derived in each instance. In contrast, the image feature model predicts that changes in the local features should affect performance.
In the experiment performance was consistent with a local feature account-subjects were faster to recognize the objects when the rotation produced only a distortion of the features present in the original image as compared to when the particular features present in the original image changed into new features with the rotation. Although there is clearly a great deal of work to be done regarding the types of features that form viewpoint-dependent object representations, our results suggest that the geometry of objects is described in terms of configurations of local features-depending upon the distinctiveness of the features necessary to perform a given discrimination recognition performance may appear more or less viewpoint dependent. Thus, we can hypothesize that a single visual recognition mechanism is sufficient to mediate the continuum of categorization tasks, from basic-level classification to item-specific recognition, with which we are presented.
Perceptual Expertise and the Fine-Tuning of Recognition Mechanisms
Up to this point I have focused on how object geometry and the specificity of the level of categorization can influence recognition performance. It is clear, however, that these two factors alone are insufficient to account for human recognition competence. A third factor, the degree of experience or expertise an observer has with a given object class is equally important for understanding recognition behavior. Perhaps the most salient example of this facet of recognition is face recognition-humans are unquestionably more expert at recognizing human faces at the individual level as then they are at recognizing members of any other stimulus class. There are many reasons for this high level of expertise. Two of the most critical are the social significance of faces and the fact that we are apparently predisposed to be interested in individual faces from the first moments of birth onwards (Johnson & Morton, 1991) . The fundamental The 30° rotation from center to left yields a qualitative shift from a cusp with a tangent line into an arrow vertex; the 30° rotation from center to right yields only a distortion of the cusp with a tangent line. Human observers are more sensitive to qualitative shifts in local features as compared to simple distortions in local features. question is whether humans are simply biologically predisposed to detect faces and then learn them using more generic visual recognition processes or whether humans have face-specific recognition mechanisms distinct from other recognition processes. Given the picture I have painted of human visual recognition as a flexible system capable of supporting a wide range of tasks, it has been my hypothesis that while face recognition is certainly the most complex discrimination task most of us ever learn to perform, it is still part and parcel of general recognition mechanisms, albeit mechanisms that have tuned to recognize specific faces through many years of experience.
There have been several recent claims to the contrary. Researchers from both the behavioral and cognitive neuroscientific domains have garnered evidence that seems to suggest that faces are "special" and are processed by a recognition system distinct from that used for non-face objects. Isabel Gauthier and I, however, observed that many of these studies, regardless of domain, had a common flaw-they tended to confound stimulus class, faces vs. objects, with the level of categorization, itemspecific level vs. basic-level, and the level of expertise, expert vs. novice. To better understand the relationship of face recognition to normal object recognition we embarked on a series of experiments using behavioral psychophysics, fMRI, and brain-injured subjects. The underlying theme to all of these studies is careful control of the level of categorization and the level of expertise in addition to manipulation of the stimulus class.
One of the most important pieces of evidence cited in favor of face-specific mechanisms is what is referred to as "configural sensitivity." Although this sometimes confusing term has been defined in many ways, the essential idea is that features within the representation are spatially located relative to one another with a great deal of specificity. For example, James Tanaka and Martha Farah (1993) reported that subjects were faster to recognize a part of an individual's face, e.g., Bob's nose, when it was shown in the context of the face as originally learned, e.g., Bob's nose in Bob's face, as compared to recognizing the same part when it was shown in the face with other parts in altered spatial positions, e.g., Bob's nose in Bob's face with the eyes moved further apart. Crucially, they observed that the same effect could not be obtained for either inverted faces or for non-face objects, for instance, recognizing doors of houses with the windows either in the same position or relocated. Although this result might seem to provide some support for face-specific effects in part recognition, Gauthier and I felt that houses were an inadequate control for faces. In particular, few if any of Tanaka and Farah's subjects were likely to be house experts, and even if they were, houses form a far more heterogeneous class as compared to faces.
To provide a better control set for faces, Gauthier and I supervised the creation of what became known as the "Greebles" (created by Scott Yu). Greebles were designed as a set of 60 objects that shared similar parts in similar spatial configurations (Figure 1e ). What made Greebles unique was that, as with faces, they were also organized hierarchically so that an individual Greeble could be recognized at multiple levels of categorical difficulty-a coarse level referred to a gender, an intermediate level referred to as family, and at the individual level (Figure 6 ). Gauthier and I designed a test of configural sensitivity similar to that employed by Tanaka and Farah. Subjects learned to name individual parts of each Greeble and were then tested on the recognition of such parts in either intact or altered configurations of the other parts. The critical manipulation in our study was not the use of Greebles per se, but how much experience subjects had at recognizing them. One group of subjects were tested as novices, that is, they had almost no practice at recognizing Greebles.
A second group of subjects were tested as experts, that is, they had extensive practice recognizing Greebles. To ensure that subjects were sufficiently expert, we used the rule that subjects had to practice recognizing Greebles until they were just as fast to name individual Greebles as they were to identify the Greeble gender or family-a fact of recognition behavior that is true for identifying faces, as well as other domains of expertise (Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) . Our results supported the hypothesis that expertise, not faces per se, was responsible for the configural sensitivity observed in face recognition. Experts, but not novices, showed configural sensitivity in the recognition of Greeble parts, but only for Greebles in the trained upright orientation . In a subsequent study we have compared a wide range of putatively face-specific behavioral effects across Greeble novices and Greeble experts and have consistently obtained face-like patterns of performance with experts, but not novices (Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, in press) . A second source of evidence cited in favor of face-specific mechanisms comes from recent work in brain imaging, and, specifically fMRI. Several groups have been interested in the question of whether there is an identifiable neural module for face processing in the human brain (Kanwisher, Chun, McDermott, & Ledden, 1996; Puce, Allison, Gore, & McCarthy, 1995) . A typical imaging study has involved having subjects either recognize or passively view familiar faces in one condition and common objects in the baseline condition. By subtracting the activation (as indicated by the degree of blood oxygenation in different areas of the brain) of the object condition from the face condition, one can localize the brain regions where additional processing occurs for faces relative to objects. Across multiple studies, researchers consistently found that one region of visual cortex, the fusiform gyrus, is especially active in face recognition.
Again Gauthier and I wondered whether the proper controls had been applied in these studies. Along with issues regarding the level of expertise, an obvious confound with stimulus class was the level of categorical access. Subjects in these experiments had to identify faces at the individual level ("Bob"), but objects only at the basic level ("bird").
In the studies using passive viewing a similar problem existed-the default level of access for faces is almost certainly the individual level, while for common objects it is typically the basic level. What we proposed was a face recognition study without faces. We took a large collection of pictures of familiar common objects that could be readily named at both the basic and subordinate levels, verified that the default level of access for each was the basic level, and used the objects in an fMRI study. We compared brain activity in two conditions: one in which subjects matched a basic-level label to each picture (e.g., "bird" followed by a picture of a pelican) and one in which subjects matched a subordinate-level label to each picture (e.g., "pelican" followed by the same picture of a pelican). To control for possible differences in the semantic processing of basic-and subordinate-level labels we also ran a purely semantic task at both levels and subtracted the semantic activation from the picturematching activation for both conditions. What we found bore out our hunch regarding earlier studies-as shown in Figure 7 , across 8 subjects we obtained a bilateral pattern of activation for the subordinate-level recognition of objects above and beyond the basic-level recognition of objects that was remarkably similar to that previously found for faces (Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997a) .
Although our imaging results point towards a brain region that mediates subordinatelevel recognition regardless of stimulus class, it is possible that by averaging across subjects we masked differences in the area mediating face processing and the area mediating object processing within individual subjects. Thus, while the face and object areas may appear similar on average, individuals may have separable regions. Gauthier and I have recently addressed this concern by locating individual subjects'
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LEFT RIGHT LEFT Figure 7 . The top panel shows an average of those brain regions typically associated with face recognition based on earlier imaging studies (Kanwisher et al., 1996; Puce et al., 1995) . The bottom two panels show the activation we obtained for the subordinatelevel recognition of common objects over and above basic-level recognition. Positive activation is highlighted by white outlines. The top panel is adapted from the on-line "Whole Brain Atlas" (http://www.med.harvard.edu/AANLIB/home.html) and the bottom panel from .
"face areas" using passive viewing of faces vs. objects. We then ran the same individuals in a basic-level vs. subordinate-level recognition task with common objects. The individual results replicated our earlier group-averaged results even when the "face area" was defined precisely for each subject.
Gauthier and I were also interested in whether the specificity of the categorization judgment was the only factor driving activation in the fusiform gyrus. From our Greeble studies we knew that manipulating the level of expertise could produce "face-specific" behavioral effects with non-face objects (both novices and experts performed subordinate-level discriminations, so the level of access could not account for our earlier results). Thus, expertise level was a second factor confounded with the stimulus class in some imaging studies. The logical, but risky, study to run was one in which we created Greeble experts and used fMRI to monitor the reorganization of visual cortex over the acquisition of expertise. Such a design would allow us to study the role of expertise separately from any effects arising from the level of categorization.
As part of her Ph.D. dissertation, Gauthier compared the brain regions active in the processing of faces and Greebles when subjects were novices and when subjects were experts. For both types of stimuli we used two methods to localize the areas of visual cortex specific associated with processing a given class of objects: passive viewing of faces or Greebles as compared to passive viewing of common objects; pairwise matching of upright faces or Greebles as compared to pairwise matching of inverted faces or Greebles. The activation patterns for novices were as predicted based on earlier imaging and behavioral studies of face recognition-a "face-specific" area in fusiform gyrus that was present for faces vs. objects and for upright vs. inverted faces, but not for Greebles vs. objects or upright vs. inverted Greebles. For Greeble experts a quite different and somewhat remarkable pattern was obtained. Experts showed much more focal activation in visual cortex and, in particular, activation in right fusiform gyrus in the precise location associated with face processing as measured in our two face recognition tasks. We also monitored changes in subjects' behavioral processing of Greebles during the acquisition of expertise and replicated our earlier results demonstrating that Greeble experts show a range of "face-specific" effects when recognizing Greebles. Thus, through behavioral and concurrent neural evidence we are beginning to understand the mechanisms that lead to functional specialization in visual cortex. Rather than being organized along conceptual object categories, specific cortical areas appear to be components of a highly plastic visual recognition system that can be tuned to perform efficient fine-level visual discriminations.
A third and highly compelling source of evidence cited in favor of face-specific mechanisms comes from neuropsychology. Following brain injury due to stroke or head impact some individuals appear to be dramatically impaired at visually recognizing objects even though their early perceptual mechanisms are intact. A particular version of this syndrome provides evidence for a specialized face processing system-some brain-injured subjects, known as "prosopagnosics," show impaired face recognition, but are relatively good at non-face object recognition. Although some researchers have pointed out that this deficit may apply more generally to the discrimination of visually-similar members of any homogeneous category (Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982) , there has been a general consensus that prosopagnosic subjects provide one of the strongest pieces of evidence for facespecific recognition mechanisms. In a test of whether prosopagnosia is a face-specific impairment, rather than a consequence of the item-specific nature of face recognition, Martha Farah and her colleagues compared the recognition of faces and homogeneous classes of common objects, chairs or eyeglasses, for normal control subjects and one prosopagnosic subject. They found that in comparison to the controls the prosopagnosic subject's recognition performance was disproportionately worse for faces relative to objects. Their conclusion was that there exist face-specific neural mechanisms and that prosopagnosic impairment "cannot be accounted for as an impairment of within-category discrimination" (Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995) .
Farah et al.'s conclusion seemed at odds with the conclusions that Gauthier and I had reached on the basis of our behavioral and fMRI studies. Two open issues led us to question whether there might be more to prosopagnosic subjects' deficits than facespecific impairment. First, although discriminating between chairs or eyeglasses implicated subordinate-level recognition, there may have been local distinct features within both classes that allowed the prosopagnosic subject to perform better with common objects relative to faces. In contrast, control subjects with normal recognition processes would not need to rely on such local feature-based strategies and would show good recognition regardless of stimulus class. Second, we felt that it was important to consider prosopagnosic subjects' performance using measures other than percent correct, for example response time or a bias-free measure such as sensitivity (which takes into account the ratio between the number of times that the subject responds correctly to a "yes" trial, called a "hit," and the number of times that the subject responds incorrectly to a "no" trial, called a "false alarm"). This latter point is critical in that prosopagnosic subjects may expend more effort attempting to identify objects as compared to faces. They also may believe that they are poorer at face recognition relative to common object recognition (e.g., a bias that would contaminate the percent correct score but would not influence a sensitivity score)-in our interactions with specific prosopagnosic subjects we had in fact noted that they do show stronger response biases than normals, as well as speed-accuracy trade-offs.
In collaboration with my colleague Marlene Behrmann, we embarked on a series of experiments that systematically varied the level of categorization for common objects, Greebles, snowflakes (a highly homogeneous category), and faces. In each condition we ran identical experiments with normal controls and two prosopagnosic subjects and recorded both response times and sensitivity. Two results stand out. First, we found that the apparent disproportionate impairment for faces as compared to nonface objects could be replicated if we looked only at percent correct, but that response times showed a trade-off in that the prosopagnosic subjects took much longer to recognize the non-face objects relative to faces. Second, we observed that if we controlled the amount of time subjects could view stimuli from each class, the same prosopagnosic subjects revealed similar impairments, as measured by sensitivity, for recognizing both faces and non-face objects. Important to our hypothesis, when sensitivity for faces and non-face objects was equated, it became obvious that the prosopagnosic subjects' deficit became progressively more pronounced at the more specific levels of recognition regardless of the object category. To summarize our results, we have obtained evidence that independent of object category, our two prosopagnosic subjects are far more sensitive to the manipulation of the level of Visual Object Recognition -17-categorization as compared to our control subjects. Thus, apparent face recognition deficits may be better explained as deficits in recognizing objects at more specific levels of discrimination.
Taken together, our behavioral, imaging, and neuropsychological work serves to implicate both the level of categorization and the level of perceptual expertise as important factors in visual recognition tasks. Indeed, it is our hypothesis that the interaction of these two factors is sufficient to explain the impressive specialization of face recognition mechanisms in visual cortex. Future studies will continue to investigate this issue, for example using far more sophisticated classes of novel objects (Figure 1f is one such creation). If we also consider object geometry we have the foundations for forming a complete picture of recognition competence. Each of these facets of recognition varies along a continuum that cannot be explained by simple dissociations between cognitive or neural systems. More likely is that we need to consider the interaction of all three factors and how a single recognition system can be flexible enough to adapt to the wide range of recognition contexts that we encounter everyday. It is this problem that we turn to next.
Implications for Models of Recognition
My research to date has focused on elucidating the factors that are critical to understanding the cognitive and neurological bases of human object recognition. It is my contention that the results we have obtained over the past several years implicate a single highly plastic visual recognition system. The challenge over the coming years is to develop computational models that can account for these remarkable abilities. In a first attempt to simulate some of the complexity of human recognition competence, as part of his Ph.D. dissertation, my former student Pepper Williams (1997) developed a neural-network model for shape recognition. His goal was to develop a neural-network model that could recognize a set of novel, complex multi-part objects. Williams found that his relatively simple network, dubbed "WHOA," was able to replicate a wide range of behavioral effects, including learning object categories. Importantly, in addition to categorical knowledge, WHOA still showed item-specific sensitivity, thereby providing some evidence that a single system may be sufficient for seemingly disparate recognition tasks. Williams was also able to apply the WHOA, with no modifications, to the problem of learning Greebles. We found that the model did surprisingly well at simulating the onset of perceptual expertise and was again able to account for both generalization across categories and individuation within categories (Gauthier et al., in press ).
Although a single architecture may be sufficient for spanning a range of categorical levels, it is still likely that different elements of the representation may play different roles in recognition. A hypothesis I have begun to develop is the idea that different spatial scales (analogous to blurry vs. sharp images- Figure 8 ) can support varying levels of categorization. The essential idea is that complete images may provide too much information given that the problem of basic-level classification is to map many instances of a class onto a single category. On the other hand there are reasons to believe that blurry, high-contrast images very similar to object silhouettes provide a description that is relatively stable over members of a perceptual class. Reasons include the fact that the WHOA model is one of several computational models that have used silhouettes as input and that there are known to be separable neural pathways for transmitting blurred high-contrast visual information and detailed lowercontrast information.
To investigate the role of silhouettes in recognition, we developed two lines of research: one in which we asked whether basic-level recognition processes are more sensitive to object silhouettes than otherwise might be expected and one in which we examined whether there is sufficient information in object silhouettes to separate object categories. As part of his Ph.D. dissertation, my former student William Hayward (in press) compared the recognition of common objects across rotations in depth. After viewing an intact image of an object, the same object was presented again at either a 60° rotation that showed similar surfaces and parts to the original, but a quite different silhouette, or a 180° rotation that showed quite different surfaces and parts, but a silhouette that was a mirror-reflection of the original's silhouette. We found that subjects were actually faster and more accurate to identify objects given the similar silhouettes as compared to similar surfaces or parts. This rather surprising result indicates that silhouettes appear able to mediate some aspects of visual recognition (although we have evidence that silhouettes are not the only type of information represented).
To get more directly at the question of what role silhouettes might play in recognition, Florin Cutzu and I developed several simple methods for measuring silhouette similarity-these ranged from computing pointby-point correspondences along the boundary of the silhouette to measuring the area of overlap between silhouettes. We conjectured that simply by clustering object instances based on silhouette similarity we would be able to separate most instances of one object class from instances of a second object class. To provide a strong test of our model we used silhouettes of cats and dogs-two highly similar categories. Importantly, exactly these stimuli had been used in a study in which it was demonstrated that human infants were capable of perceptually differentiating Figure 8 . Descriptions including surface detail, subtle changes in brightness, and fine shape differences may be necessary for making within-category discriminations. In contrast, descriptions including only high-contrast blurred information-similar to silhouettes-may support basic-level categorization. This figure illustrates the point that given complete images, instances of a given category are still quite different from one another, but given silhouette-like images, such instances become more similar. Interestingly, human infants receive visual input that is closer to the bottom row, suggesting that they may begin life by learning coarser visual categories and then move towards differentiating instances within these categories only during the later stages of development.
between these basic-level classes (Quinn & Eimas, 1994) . Thus, we knew that babies were able to able to tell the cats from the dogs based purely on visual information-could our model do the same? Our results were quite clear-despite the high degree of similarity between cats and dogs (telling cars from chairs would not have been much of a challenge) we found that our relatively simple measure of silhouette similarity provided good separation between object classes (Cutzu & Tarr, 1997) . Thus, we have some evidence that silhouette-like information is sufficient for basic-level categorization.
The possibility that silhouette-like information forms an important level of visual representation leads to an intriguing conjecture-limiting early visual input to silhouette-like information may be essential for forming stable perceptual categories. It is known that human infants are born somewhat myopic and prefer high-contrast images. Other than being an accident of development, is there any potential benefit to this state? If a developing visual system were to receive complete, fully-detailed images, each object would appear quite distinct from all previously-seen objects and a many-to-one mapping might not arise. In contrast, if the visual system initially receives only coarse information then perceptual "bins" corresponding to categories may emerge ( Figure 8 ). As the visual system develops, increasingly finer information will become available, thereby allowing in-place coarse categories to be refined into subclasses and specific instances for within-category recognition tasks. Thus, while silhouette-like information may mediate the recognition of perceptual categories in adults, it may be even more important for acquiring such categories in the first place. In the study of language it has been suggested that "starting small" (Elman, 1993) in terms of memory span is essential for learning syntactic categories. Similarly, "starting blurry" may be essential for learning visual categories.
As mentioned, we have some evidence that silhouette-like information forms only one element of object representations. To support more specific levels of recognition, finer surface details and variations in shape must be considered. There are several models of recognition that have proposed object representations based on large numbers of viewpoint-dependent local features (e.g., Edelman, 1995) . By allowing the repertoire of features to be quite broad, including local surface patches, local measures of color and brightness, oriented edges, and contour configurations, many of the details that are necessary for within-category recognition may be captured. At the same time the feature set may include more global regions that are sensitive only to high-contrast boundaries, thereby capturing the silhouette-like level of information. Thus, a single view of an object might include thousands of features at multiple spatial scales. Categorical recognition could be mediated by measuring similarity across the coarse levels of information-votes would be tallied across views of all known objects with similar silhouettes. More specific levels of categorization could be mediated by measuring similarity across finer and finer levels of information-as the information required for a given discrimination becomes more and more specific to a particular object, the number of features that will vote will become progressively more narrow, thereby implicating fewer and fewer known objects.
Representing objects as collections of viewpoint-dependent features leads to several fundamental questions. First, individual features are rarely distinctive enough to uniquely specify a single object or class-it is only the configuration of features that allows effective recognition. How then are local features within the representation related to one another? One straightforward answer is the object representation system is sensitive to the spatial co-occurrence of individual features. The more frequently any set of features are seen together at specific spatial positions, the more tightly they will be linked to one another (a form of what is known as "Hebbian learning"). Object representations will be comprised of features who's spatial positions are more or less strongly related to one another-features that co-occur quite often in a given configuration (as in the surfaces found on a single part of an object) will become strongly interdependent with the presence of a subset of the features activating the entire ensemble; in contrast, features that do not co-occur very often (as in the surfaces found on different parts of an articulated object) will be connected only weakly or not at all. This simple statistical learning mechanism may provide an explanation for the configural sensitivity found in cases of perceptual expertise, including face recognition. The acquisition of expertise is marked by extensive practice differentiating similar instances from a single class-consequently many class-level features will co-occur in the same configuration with great frequency, for example, the eyes, nose, and mouth of human faces. Such oft-seen features will become tightly interdependent as the system is fined tuned by experience. Thus, relocating the position of one such feature will impact the recognition of the other features-much as has been found for parts of human faces and for parts of Greebles when recognized by experts.
Second, if different views of objects are composed of different sets of features, how are different views within the representation related to one another? Interestingly a principle similar to that used to link features may be used to link different views of an object. The single most likely image to occur following a view of an object is another view of that same object. Therefore, a recognition system that is sensitive to the temporal co-occurrence of sets of features would learn, over experience, to link those views that arise from single objects-thereby forming a multiple-views representation (Figure 3 ). Neurophysiological evidence suggests that neurons in visual cortex are indeed sensitive to co-occurrence over time-remarkably even in those cases where there is no geometric similarity between the views that become associated (Miyashita, 1988) .
Conclusions
A relatively simple experiment exploring whether visual recognition is based on viewpoint-dependent or viewpoint-independent information has led to an extensive research program employing psychophysical and neuropsychological methods. At the core of this program has been the idea that there is a complex interaction between three aspects of recognition: the geometry of images over variation in the environment; the level of categorical specificity required for a given task; and the degree of experience the perceiver has with specific object classes. In my laboratory we have investigated each of these issues, asking whether a single visual recognition system is sufficient to account for the continuum of behaviors seen in each case. Converging evidence provides a preliminary "yes" to this question. Multiple-views representations can account for the recognition performance observed across changes in viewpoint in subordinate-level recognition tasks. Similar viewpoint-dependent mechanisms appear capable of supporting basic-level recognition tasks and the recognition of new instances of familiar categories. Finally, the complete range of recognition tasks, including face recognition, can be accounted for by considering the degree of perceptual expertise. Thus, humans appear to have a single highly adaptable visual recognition system that can be fine-tuned by experience to support a spectrum of recognition behaviors. Although there is clearly much work to be done, we have begun to illuminate some of the properties of this remarkable system.
